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Summary: Effects of the US Worldwide Tax Regime on Domestic Investment
Summary
There are two basic systems for international corporate taxation. The US operates under a worldwide
taxation system, in which the US government asserts its right to tax the global income of US resident
corporations, whether that income is earned within the US or outside it. The US is the only G7 nation that
maintains such a tax system. The majority of other nations in the world use a territorial taxation regime. A
territorial regime embodies a source-based system where countries only tax business activity that
happens within their borders. This summary of Professor Jennifer Blouin's B-School Seminar, focuses on
differences in corporate tax regimes worldwide and the implications for corporate tax reform.
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Better-informed policymaking through a deeper
understanding of economics.

Summary: Understanding the Effects of US Corporate
Tax Policy on Multinational Firms’ Investment
Seminar by Professor Jennifer Blouin
WORLDWIDE VS. TERRITORIAL REGIMES

Figure 1: Worldwide vs. Territorial Taxation - with 10% Foreign Tax

There are two basic systems for international corporate taxation.
The US operates under a worldwide taxation system, in which
the US government asserts its right to tax the global income of US
resident corporations, whether that income is earned within the US
or outside it. The US is the only G7 nation that maintains such a tax
system. The majority of other nations in the world use a territorial
taxation regime. A territorial regime embodies a source-based system where countries only tax business activity that happens within
their borders.
Historically, maintaining a worldwide tax system seemed advantageous for the US. Since the early 1990s, the top US corporate
tax rate has been either 34% or 35%, and for a long time many of
America’s key trading partners had corporate tax rates higher than
that. But today, the average tax rate among OECD nations outside
the US is approximately 25%, and the US’s major trading partners
all have a tax rate below 35%.

Figure 2: Worldwide vs. Territorial Taxation - with 40% Foreign Tax

The differential financial impact of the US worldwide tax system is
illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2, showing after-tax cash flows for
a US parent company and a Canadian parent company, each with a
subsidiary in Ireland, and comparing scenarios where the Irish tax
rate is 10%, versus a more historical scenario when the Irish tax
rate might have been 40%.
As Figure 2 illustrates, the after-tax cash flows for the two parent
companies are the same when the foreign tax is at the higher rate.
But when operating under a territorial tax regime with a lower tax
rate, the foreign competitor is able to yield a higher after-tax cash
flow. This carries significant implications for business investment,
making it harder for US companies to compete. Consequently, US
companies often complain that they are mistreated from a US tax
policy perspective.

DEFERRAL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

To help address the competitiveness problem, the US offers the

concept of deferral: the tax is not imposed until the cash is
remitted, or repatriated, back to the United States. But even with
deferrals, the US worldwide system has become problematic. When
a company puts money into a business investment in a low-tax
jurisdiction overseas, it not only defers the US taxes, but the value
of the investment continues to compound over time. This affects
the calculation of the after-tax rate of return. In fact, it is possible
that a US company can do better investing a foreign project with a
lower pre-tax rate of return, as opposed to investing in a domestic
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project with a higher pre-tax rate of return, because deferral can
lead to a higher after-tax rate of return for the foreign project. (See
Figure 3 for an example.)
Figure 3: Comparison of Project After-Tax Returns: U.S. versus Foreign

US companies like the ability to defer their tax obligation. But to
the extent that it can incentivize firms to invest in projects overseas
with lower pre-tax rates of return, it is distortionary and thus bad
economic policy. There is in fact evidence that US multinationals
with a lot of cash “trapped” outside the US wind up over-investing
in foreign mergers and acquisitions.
Other mechanisms that might allow for more domestic investment—i.e., having a foreign affiliate lend earnings to the US parent,
or guarantee a bank loan to the US parent, or invest directly in the
US—are considered acts of repatriation that would trigger the very
taxes that US multinationals are trying to defer. Funds from the
foreign affiliate can even be sitting in a US bank, but they cannot be
used by the US parent company for productive purposes without
incurring the repatriation tax.
Consequently, we also see a lot of domestic borrowing among US
multinationals. Borrowing to fund domestic activites is ultimately
less expensive than repatriating foreign earnings. For example,
consider Apple, Inc. Three-quarters of Apple’s balance sheet is
in cash and marketable securities, but they have been borrowing
domestically to pay dividends. It is cheaper to pay the interest rate
for borrowing than to pay the repatriation tax.

CORPORATE TAX PLANNING
For all intents and purposes, US companies have “tax planned
themselves” into a territorial system in order to avoid triggering the
imposition of the US worldwide tax rate. Such tax planning has led
several major US firms to pursue strategies such as the so-called
“Dutch Sandwich” or “Double Irish” corporate structures. Take Google, for example. The intellectual property rights that drives Google
are held in Google Ireland Holdings (Bermuda). Google Ireland LTD,
which collects the income from data and ad revenue generated
by everyone Google-ing outside the United States. It then has a
licensing agreement with Google Netherlands Holdings BV, a Dutch
entity; Google Ireland LTD pays most of its income as a royalty
payment to Google Netherlands Holdings. Google Netherlands
Holdings, in turn, has a licensing agreement with Google Ireland
Holdings (Bermuda) to pay 99.8% of royalty payment proceeds.
The intermediary Dutch entity is key. Ireland’s tax rate is around
15%. Withholding tax rates are imposed on royalties as flows of
cash move between intermediaries. Transfers directly from Ireland
to Bermuda, for instance, would be taxed at 20%. But with the
Dutch intermediary, transfers from Ireland to the Netherlands are
taxed at 0% because of EU trading agreements, and then transfers
from the Netherlands to Bermuda are also 0%, as they are

historically close trading partners. And Ireland, for its part, is satisfied with the income generated from taxing the personal income,
assets, and economic activity indirectly derived from Google’s
operations located in Ireland. Such arrangements are facilitated by
the “check-the-box” rule, which allows a US corporation to elect, by
checking a box on their tax return, to have certain foreign subsidiaries treated as if they do not exist (or are disregarded) for purposes
of US corporate income tax reporting. The US government recognizes only legal entities deemed to be corporations. This means there
is no backstop to prevent the creation of such convoluted organizational structures to mitigate withholding taxes. Check-the-box also
enables the practice of earnings stripping, a practice by which a
firm makes a loan to a subsidiary for operational expenses, allowing
the subsidiary to deduct interest payments related to this loan from
its earnings, avoid US anti-abuse provisions and thus reduce the
firm’s overall tax liability.
Figure 4: Firms with the Largest 2015/2016 Indefinitely Reinvested Earnings —
 In $ Billions

LOCKOUTS
Looking beyond issues of deferrals and the artificiality of moving
and holding assets overseas, the US tax system also fosters a state
of “earnings lockout.” The US has an accrual basis of accounting
for financial reporting, so firms accrue the expense for estimated
taxes that they owe on earnings. But if these earnings are indefinitely (or permanently) invested overseas, firms don’t have to make
the accrual for the incremental US taxes that would be due upon
their repatriation. Consequently, firms with indefinitely reinvested
earnings not only get the cash flow benefits of deferring the US tax
on income earned overseas, but they also get the capital markets
benefits. It is estimated that US companies have upwards of $2.5
trillion in indefinitely reinvested earnings, equating to billions in
unrecognized tax liabilities.
Cash is also getting locked out, along with earnings. Looking at
major companies, only 20% of their cash is held in the US—and
sometimes much less. At the start of 2016, Johnson & Johnson
reported having $38.3 billion in total cash, but only $0.1 billion of
that was in the US.
When thinking about policy, though, the focus should be on the
earnings, not cash. Cash and earnings are not the same thing, and it
is the unremitted earnings that get taxed. The current, widespread
practice of permanently reinvesting earnings is itself a response
to federal policy—specifically, the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, which offered the first pure tax holiday ever in the US. At the
time, Congress had promised that it would be a one-time deal. But
it set a precedent that has altered the expectations and behavior
of US firms. They are waiting for another tax holiday in light of
the one in 2004. Or, barring that, they are waiting for tax reform
that will transition the US to a territorial regime. But as current tax
planning practices make clear, what US multinationals are not going
to do is pay the 35%.
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